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Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP83-00036R001100090003-7

31 May 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR [REDACTED]

SUBJECT: Proposed OPC "Party Line" with Certain Key People in Washington

1. The Communist conquest of China will lead to Communist conquest of Indo-China, Siam, Burma, Malay States, Indonesia and India. The greatest weakness of the Soviet Union up to the present time has been lack of manpower to develop rapidly the enormous resources of the Soviet Union. Labor in Siberian camps has been most valuable. Chinese manpower can now be used by the million for development of oil fields, ore fields, and even the construction of a railroad across northern Siberia south of the Arctic Circle all the way to the Bering Straits. The Soviet government has made it clear that the conquest of China will turn the balance of power in the world in favor of the Soviet Union. The loss of Asia will render it impossible to build up such a body of strength against the Soviet Union that the Soviet Union will not at some future date dare to risk war. The question, therefore, has become not one of constructive foreign policy for the settlement of international political problems by peaceful means but one of seeing to it that when the third world war comes it shall, from the point of view of the United States, be well engaged instead of badly engaged.

2. In other words, and insofar as humanly possible, the preponderance of strength should be on the American side. To take an example from the past: From the point of view of the French, the War of 1914 was well engaged; Russia was the Ally of France; the French had a secret agreement with the Italian Government providing that Italy would under no circumstances make war against France; and Great Britain was strong economically and financially and had an excellent, though small Army. The French Air Force was at least equal to the German Air Force. On the other hand, from the French point of view the second World War was badly engaged. Italy was the Ally of France. Russia was a secret and useful collaborator of Germany. Great Britain had only four divisions capable of fighting on the continent and Germany had an overwhelming supply of planes and tanks.

3. If the United States is to survive a third world war, American policy must be based on the objective that the war which will come should be well engaged from our point of view.

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4. The military authorities of the United States should therefore determine precisely plans for the third world war which should be well engaged; what means are to be used to compel the surrender of the Soviet Union and what lines are essential. Foreign policy should be directed toward supporting these military conclusions.

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| Approved For Release 2002/01/09 : CIA-RDP83-00036R001100090003-7 | | | | DOC DATE CLASS S |
| HQ | OPC | DDP | [REDACTED] | 31 May 49 |
| | | | | 15 June |
| | | | | 1949 |
| Policy ; Planning | | | | |

IDENTIFICATION OF DOCUMENT

Memo from [REDACTED] ADPC to Mr. Offie [of OPC]. Subject: Proposed OPC "Party Line" with Certain Key People in Washington [Ref: Memo from Carmel Offie to [REDACTED] Subject: as above]

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ABSTRACT NOTATION REFERENCES

ADPC points out that proposed "line" in ref. memo would not be in accord with reasoning which led to the establishment of OPC and would moreover appear to involve OPC in policy matters not OPC's concern.

DOCUMENT LOCATION

HS/CSG-1623 ✓

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